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Abstract
We suggest a methodology to calibrate a collective model with household-specic
bargaining rules and marriage-specic preferences that incorporate leisure external-
ities. The empirical identication relies on the assumption that some aspects of
individual preferences remain the same after marriage, so that estimation on single
individuals can be used. The procedure maps the complete Pareto frontier of each
household in the dataset and we dene alternative measures of a power index. The
latter is then regressed on relevant bargaining factors, including a set of variables
retracing the potential relative contributions of the spouses to household disposable
income. In its capacity to handle complex budget sets and labor force participation
decisions of both spouses, this framework o¤ers a unique chance to compare unitary
and collective predictions of labor supply reactions and welfare changes entailed by
scal reforms (see Michal Myck et al., and Denis Beninger et al., this issue).
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The collective approach to household behavior is gradually gaining ground in the ap-
plied microeconomic literature. Introduced by Pierre-André Chiappori (1988, 1992), and
Patricia Apps and Ray Rees (1988), this approach can be seen as a substantial improve-
ment over the standard, or unitary, model of household behavior. On the one hand,
the model generalizes the unitary approach to a multi-utility framework while nesting all
other cooperative models leading to e¢ ciency. On the other hand, it allows to derive orig-
inal restrictions which are rarely rejected on observed behavior of individuals in couples,
whereas tests of the unitary approach usually come to the opposite conclusion.
However, there is yet no simple way to identify and estimate a collective model of
labor supply to perform satisfying simulations of tax-benet reform, i.e. in a setting
which incorporates both participation decisions (in addition to the choice of work hours)
and realistic nonconvex budget sets arising from means-tested social and family benets.
These features are hard to handle by usual means.1
The present paper suggests a methodology to calibrate a collective model of labor
supply with household-specic bargaining rules and marriage-specic preferences that
incorporate leisure externalities. The empirical identication relies on the assumption
that some aspects of individual preferences - but not all - remain the same after marriage,
so that some parameters can be separately estimated on a sample of single individuals.
The main novelty of the approach lies in a calibration procedure to map the complete
Pareto frontier of each household in the dataset. Alternative measures of the nal location
on the frontier are interpreted as power indices. One of the latter is then regressed on
relevant bargaining factors, including a set of variables retracing the potential relative
contributions of the spouses to household disposable income (i.e. income after social
contributions, taxes and benets). In this way, tax reforms not only directly change the
budget constraint, as in the unitary model, but also potentially alter the balance of power
in the household by changing the potential relative contributions of each spouse.
In its capacity to handle nonconvex budget sets and labor force participation decisions
of both spouses, this model o¤ers a unique chance to compare behavioral responses to
tax reform simulations by the two competing approaches, namely the unitary and the
collective representations. This is the purpose of the following papers, Michal Myck et al.
(this issue) and Denis Beninger et al. (this issue).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a precise description of the
Pareto allocations in the collective setting considered here. Section 3 describes the steps
in the calibration procedure. These include the estimation of preference parameters for
singles, as well as the calibration of leisure interaction coe¢ cients, one for each spouse,
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and of a powerindex. Section 4 concludes, while the Appendix provides further details
regarding the specication and estimation methods.
2 Pareto e¢ cient household allocations
We focus on households consisting of two working-age individuals (for simplicity they will
be referred to as the spouses, although they need not be married), with their dependent
children. If present, the latter are assumed to have no bargaining power in the house-
hold, and their preferences are supposed to be internalized by the parents.2 Individual
preferences are represented by the direct utility functions:
ui = vi
 
ci; lm; lf ;d

; i = m; f; (1)
dened over a Hicksian consumption aggregate ci, and leisure amounts lm and lf as
arguments, and parameterized by a vector d of demographic characteristics like number
of children and education level. These utility functions are assumed to be increasing and
concave in own consumption and leisure. They allow for an externality with respect to
the other individuals leisure. Externalities with respect to consumption and household
public goods (e.g., rent) are excluded because in the given setting we cannot identify which
expenditures are for public consumption and which expenditures have external e¤ects.3
To nance total consumption, c, the household has limited resources
c = cm + cf  g
 
`m; `f ; wm; wf ; y;d

; (2)
where ci; wi and `i = T   li are, respectively, individual is consumption, gross wage rate
and labor supply (with T the individuals time endowment). Total nonlabor income, y,
is composed of (possibly) individually assignable nonlabor incomes ym and yf and some
other nonlabor income yh: Finally, the function g represents the way in which the tax ben-
et system to which we henceforth refer simply as the tax system generates disposable
income from these ingredients, including some household demographic characteristics.
A household allocation
 
cm; cf ; lm; lf







cm; lm; lf ;d

subject to the budget constraint (2) and to
vf
 
cf ; lm; lf ;d

 uf ; (3)
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where uf is some required utility level for the female. By varying uf , the set of Pareto
e¢ cient allocations can be traced out. The required utility level uf captures the outcome
of intrahousehold negotiation, and, hence, depends on relative wages, nonlabor incomes
and distribution factors. This level of utility also depends on the overall productivity of
the household.
Note that in the case of convex utility possibility sets (obtained when utility functions
are strongly concave and budget sets are convex; see, e.g., Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael
Whinston and Jerry Green, 1995), the above maximization problem is equivalent to the
maximization of a weighted mean of individual utilities, with weights that are functions of
wages, nonlabor income and distribution factors. This dependence is the main distinction
between the collective setting and the unitary model where preferences are independent
from wages and nonlabor income (for a precise statement, see Martin Browning, Pierre-
André Chiappori and Valérie Lechene, 2005).
3 Empirical specication and identication of the col-
lective labor supply model
There are several applications of collective labor supply models in the literature. In Fortin
and Lacroix (1997), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), Moreau and Donni (2002), and
Frederic Vermeulen (2005), collective models of labor supply are estimated for two-earner
households. In all these papers both spouseslabor supplies are assumed to be exible.
This is a serious problem that has only been partially tackled for the case where the males
labor supply is rigid. Blundell et al. (2001) introduce nonparticipation and unobserved
preference heterogeneity, under the assumption of constant marginal tax rates. Budget
constraints resulting in convex budget sets are considered by Donni (2003). These are
important improvements in the application of the collective setting, but they are not
completely satisfactory for our purposes.
As already mentioned, we introduce both nonparticipation and nonlinear income tax-
ation in our setting. This may result in nonconvex budget sets and thus in nonconvex
utility possibility sets, which rules out a weighted utilities approach (see above). A rst
characteristic of our approach is that the labor supply of both spouses will be treated as
discrete. This assumption eases econometric problems related to nonconvex budget sets
and has proven useful in the unitary setting (see, for instance, Arthur van Soest, 1995, and
Paul Bingley and Ian Walker, 1997). Taking wages, nonlabor incomes, household charac-
teristics, and the tax system as given, total household consumption can be calculated for
each combination of the individualslabor supplies.
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However, the identication of a discrete choice collective model (i.e. of individual
preferences and of the decision process) with nonconvex utility possibility sets and exter-
nalities, from observed coupleslabor supplies alone, is, if achievable at all, beyond the
scope of the present work. Therefore, a second characteristic of our approach is that the
model is identied in a piecemeal way, making use of information obtained by economet-
ric estimations, as well as information coming from a calibration exercise. The crucial
identifying assumption is the similarity of individualspreferences before and after mar-
riage. For the simpler case of two-earner households and linearized budget restrictions,
this approach is also followed by Tim Barmby and Nina Smith (2001). Marilyn Manser
and Murray Brown (1980) even assume that preferences do not change as a result of the
formation of a new household.4 Indeed, the (egoistic) utility functions for both spouses
are taken to be independent of marital status. In this way, the authors can easily dene
threat points. As will be seen below, here both individual utility functions change after
marriage with the addition of a leisure interaction term.
3.1 Specication of the individual utility functions
We now translate the Pareto optimality problem (3) in an empirically tractable form.
First, the individual utility functions vm and vf are assumed to be of the following form





= ic (d) ln
 
ci   c (d)

+ il (d) ln
 









lj   l (d)

:
The utility functions are seen to consist of two parts. First, a part corresponding to the
familiar linear expenditure system (LES), where the preference parameters c (d) and l (d)
capture subsistenceor minimum consumption and leisure which are allowed to depend on
household characteristics d. In particular, all time not spent in the market is interpreted
as leisure, but the term l (d) is assumed to consist of time required for regeneration and
for essential caring tasks when there are children in the household. Second, the utility
functions include a leisure interaction term that accounts for potential complementarity
in spousesleisure or any other interaction between them. The introduction of this term
relaxes the strong assumption of separability of individual preferences usually made in the
empirical literature on collective models.5 However, as already mentioned, this setting
does not allow for externalities with respect to consumption. Finally, individual is utility
function is strictly increasing and quasi-concave in own consumption ci and own leisure
6
li, if the following conditions are satised (i = m; f and i 6= j):
ic (d) > 0; and 
i (d) >  il (d) = ln
 
lj   l (d)

: (5)
This setting basically interprets all time not spent on the labor market as leisure, al-
though we do put some e¤ort in deducting from non-market time some time requirements
related to the demographic structure of the household (see next section). Naturally, it
would clearly be desirable to model shared leisure, the presence of children and house-
hold production in an explicit way.6 We reach the usual limits of the literature here.
In particular, the distinction between pure leisure and non-market time as an input in
the household production process is di¢ cult in the absence of adequate data (time-use
data containing also household characteristics and incomes).7 Note, however, that recent
ndings in Donni (2004) show that (i) simple functional forms which are consistent with
the traditional collective model of labor supply can sometimes be compatible with more
sophisticated models incorporating domestic production, (ii) if the domestic good is mar-
ketable, these models can be tested and partially identied using traditional household
surveys (i.e. without resort to time allocation surveys).
We now turn to the problem of identifying the parameters ic (d), 
i
l (d) and 
i (d)
(i = m; f) from observed labor supplies and household aggregate consumption, given the
mix of e¤ects coming from individual preferences and an intrahousehold bargaining process
that is reected in uf (see condition (3)).
3.2 Identication of the LES parameters of individual prefer-
ences
A crucial assumption made here is that the LES parameters ic (d) and 
i
l (d) (i = m; f)
can be identied on the basis of a sample of single males and females. This assumption,
which implies that, apart from a leisure interaction term, singles and individuals in cou-
ples have the same preferences, ceteris paribus, is of course questionable, but it is not
totally unrealistic. Moreover, it should be stressed that, in so far as singles and married
individuals can have di¤erent marginal rates of substitution between own leisure and con-
sumption, they can have di¤erent reactions to tax reforms. Proceeding in a piecemeal
way, as announced, we estimate the parameters ic (d) and 
i
l (d) separately, using two
samples of single males and single females. But ultimately, simultaneous estimation using
data concerning single and married males and females would be desirable, as it would
lead to e¢ ciency gains.
Although the minimum consumption and leisure c (d) and l (d) can in principle be
estimated, for simplicity we choose to calibrate them on the basis of published time use
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data and social minima for the di¤erent countries.8 This information is typically available
for di¤erent demographic compositions of the household.
For instance, for the UK, the National Statistics Omnibus Survey time use module
indicates that the average regeneration time for childless singles under pension age is
10.1 hours per day for women and 9.7 for men. For Germany, corresponding gures for
childless singles (drawn from the German Time Budget Survey 1991/1992, see Miriam
Beblo, 2001) are 10.2 hours of daily physiological regeneration and almost 3.3 hours for
housework for women (10 and 2.4 for men).
In the presence of children, some additional time requirements need to be taken into
account. For France, this information is obtained from the 1998 INSEE Time Allocation
Survey. An additional weekly time requirement is set according to the age of the youngest
child. For the wife and the husband this equals, respectively, 14 and 7 hours if at least
one child is below age 5, 6 and 3 hours if at least one child is between 6 and 11, 5 and
2 hours if at least one child older than 11. For German couples (see Beblo, 2001), the
additional time requirement for a full-time working man is 0.8 hours per day, if he is living
together with at least one child up to age 6. For a full-time working woman this rise in
household demands amounts to about 2 hours. For older children, i.e. if all children are
aged between 7 and 12, 0.4 hours per day are added to the fathers minimum leisureand
1 hour per day to the mothers.
3.3 Identication of leisure interaction terms and bargaining
power
The leisure interaction terms m (d) and f (d) and the females required, or negotiated,
level of utility uf remain to be identied. If the Pareto frontier were concave to the origin
(or the utility possibility set were convex), the optimal choice of hours could be obtained
by maximizing a household social welfare function dened as a convex combination of
individual utility functions. However, as a consequence of the nonconvexity of many
budget sets, the utility possibility sets of many households turn out not to be convex (this
concerns 42% of the households in Beninger et al., this issue). Thus, in order to capture all
behavior possibilities, we must adopt another approach. The chosen procedure consists
of determining each households Pareto frontier and, for given preference parameters,
searching for that point of the frontier which best corresponds to observed behavior.
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3.3.1 Pareto frontier and identication of the bargaining power
Let us now describe the calibration procedure. Given the two observed labor supplies we
can identify two parameters at the household level. Therefore, we rst restrict attention
to the identication of the bargaining power and a common leisure interaction term. The
idea is the following: for each household and for each element of a discrete set of values
(; ) for the leisure interaction terms (m (d) ; f (d)), chosen identical for both spouses,
a discrete set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations is calculated. An allocation from this set
is singled out on the basis of the best t with observed labor supplies. This serves to
identify the corresponding bargaining power parameter. In a subsequent stage, individual
leisure interaction terms m and f are identied on the basis of a parametric specication,
common to all households, for the womans bargaining power.
For each household, the algorithm used in practice is the following.
1. For each  2 fmin; :::; maxg, where  = m (d) = f (d), dene the utility level
ufmax () as the value of the womans utility when she receives a maximum share
of total household consumption (set, e.g., to 90% for Germany), and the leisure
amounts lm and lf are chosen under condition (5) in such a way that her utility
is maximal. Denote ummin () the corresponding utility level achieved by the man.
The other extreme
h




is dened symmetrically. Thus, the points
with coordinates











can be considered as
the boundaries (dictatorial positions) of the Pareto frontier for each value of the
common preference parameter .
2. Dene K utility levels ufk () = u
f






, where k =
0; :::; K. Note that the boundaries of the Pareto frontier are obtained for k = 0 and
k = K:
3. For each k, choose the labor supplies in their respective choice sets, Di, i = f;m, so
that the man maximizes his utility subject to the household budget constraint and











cf ; lm; lf ;d; 

 ufk () ;
cm + cf  g
 
`m; `f ; wm; wf ; y;d

;
`i 2 Di; i = m, f.
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This maximization procedure results in an optimal labor supply and consumption
bundle [`m (; k) ; `f (; k) ; cm (; k) ; cf (; k)] for each k:
4. Given , choose in the discrete set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations the one that mini-
mizes the criterion
 [`m (; k)  `mo ]
2 +

`f (; k)  `fo
2
(7)
over k, where `io (i = m; f) is individual is observed labor supply, and  is chosen
in order to avoid dissymmetry in the t for males and females (male labor supply
is typically more concentrated).9 This step results in an optimal labor supply and
consumption allocation

`m () ; `
f
 () ; c
m




for each couple of individual
utility functions vm (:; ) and vf (:; ). If there are multiple allocations that mini-
mize the above criterion, then the allocation minimizing the di¤erence between the
consumption levels of the spouses is selected. This step results in the choice of an
allocation indexed by k ().
5. Over all individual preferences characterized by , choose the value  that minimizes
criterion (7) with `i () in place of `
i (; k ()) :
Given the above procedure, a measure for the females bargaining power in the interval
[0,1] can be dened as
f = k () =K: (8)
This is simply a parameterization of the households location on the Pareto frontier;
the nearer this number is to one, the nearer the woman is to her dictatorial position




, and thus the higher is her bargaining power. A symmetric parame-
terization can be based on the same algorithm with the genders permuted, and this leads
to a measure m for his bargaining power. If the Pareto frontier were a straight segment,
f and m would add up to one, but if it were a portion of a circle, then their squares
would add up to one instead. This motivates a second measure which depends on the





where  is the solution to
f + 

m = 1: (10)
This measure yields more meaningful comparisons across households than the rst one
because it takes account of the shape of the Pareto frontier which varies across households.
As an alternative, we could calibrate ufk () directly, as Olivier Bargain et al. (2002)






so as to equalize wivesand husbandsutilities on average. Her utility becomes uf so
that the sum of normalized female utilities over the population equals the sum of male
utilities. Using calibrated values, we then suggest a third index for the female bargaining





Note that the above proposed measures of an individuals bargaining power are not
insensitive to the choice of the cardinalization. The index $f is clearly invariant to
(identical) linear transformation (scaling) of the spouses utilities, while some algebra
shows that the index !f is invariant to a¢ ne transformations with identical slopes for
both spouses. The characterization of measures of bargaining power that would be robust
to the choice of cardinalization is still on our research agenda. An interesting avenue for
future research may be the derivation of money metric measures of bargaining power.
This approach, however, is not straightforward in a discrete setting and may become even
more complicated within a collective model (see Kenneth Small and Sherwin Rosen, 1981,
Keshab Bhattarai and John Whalley, 1997; see also Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel,
2004, within a decentralized continuous collective model with a household consumption
technology).
The next step in the calibration exercise consists of a logistic regression of the bargain-
ing power index on a number of variables. Generally, the bargaining power is supposed
to depend on wages, prices, nonlabor income and distribution factors. However, as men-
tioned by Martin Browning and Valérie Lechene (2001), the theory of the collective model
does not give precise guidance as to which variables should be included in the set of distri-
bution factors. But the empirical literature has highlighted some exogenous factors which
potentially inuence bargaining power. Estimations usually concern the sharing rule in
decentralized collective models.10 We can think of socio-demographic characteristics of
the household such as (i) the allocation of child benets among spouses, (ii) the age dif-
ference between the spouses, (iii) the di¤erence in education level (under the assumption
that human capital decisions are exogenous), and (iv) regional indicators that may pick up
cultural di¤erences or di¤erences in sex ratios. The amount of unearned income brought
independently by each spouse may also be crucial.11
Since we are primarily concerned with the e¤ect of taxation in a collective setting,
it seems appropriate to include a distribution factor related to the relative earnings of
the spouses, or rather to their relative earning potential. Gross wage rates are clearly
not attractive, because they do not change with the reforms at stake. Net wages are
not attractive either because the theory of the collective model imposes the exogeneity
11
of the distribution factors. Still, some measure summarizing the way in which the tax
system potentially modies the relative net earnings of the spouses can be included. In
the empirical exercise, the females and males marginal contributions to the households
earnings when switching from the lowest labor supply choice to the highest are opted
for. Specically, we consider two such variables, y40d and y
20
d dened as follows. Let p
j
f
and pjm denote the observed sample frequencies of (discretized) weekly labor supplies `
j
of wives and husbands, respectively. Denote Rfj
0
mj the household disposable income when
the husband works `j hours and the wife works `j
0











measures the expected increase in the household disposable income if the wife switches
from 0 to 40 hours, the expectation being taken over the maleshours distribution. Den-
ing y20f and y
40













which we term relative earning powerof the wife at 40 hours (resp. 20).
In view of the above discussion, let e be a vector of explanatory variables that do
not belong to the vector of household characteristics d, but that are assumed to a¤ect
spouses bargaining power (relative earning power, assignable nonlabor incomes, etc.).
The estimated bargaining power index is then denoted by !f (e;d). The cross-sectional
variation in potential relative earnings identies the e¤ect of the tax system on the power
index.12 Note, however, that our indicator of relative earning power does not allow to dis-
tinguish between di¤erent types of tax-benet instruments generating an identical change
in earning capacity. The role of these tax-benet instruments may be di¤erent in the
negotiation and, hence, the nature of a reform can be important. A targeted reform with
a gender tag- as in Shelly Lundberg, Robert Pollak and Terence Wales (1997) - may
have a stronger inuence on household behavior than a reform of income taxation in a
country with joint taxation (see Donni, 2003, for a more general discussion).
3.3.2 Identication of the leisure interaction terms
Once we have obtained an estimated bargaining power index for each household, the above
algorithm is redened to include this !f (e;d) and two di¤erent leisure interaction terms,
one for each spouse.












in the same way as before.
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that k is the integer nearest to !f (e;d)
1=K.13


















c = cm + cf  g
 
`m; `f ; wm; wf ; y;d

;
`i 2 Di; i = m, f.






































Again, in the case of multiple solutions select the solution entailing the smallest
discrepancy between the consumption levels of the spouses.
5. Finally, the calibrated m and f parameters are regressed on a set of household
characteristics. Estimated parameters, say m (d) and f (d), close the model.14
At the end of the exercise we have at our disposal a set of collectiveparameters which
allow to predict labor supplies by means of the identied collective model and conditional
on observed and imputed gross wages, household characteristics and the tax system. In
this way, we can generate a collectivedataset which forms the baseline for (i) welfare
analysis of tax reforms with a collective model, and (ii) estimation of a unitary model for
quantication of the distortions in welfare analysis associated with the use of a unitary
model in a collective world (see Myck et al., this issue, and Beninger et al., this issue).
The Appendix gives further details on the estimation procedures used and empirical
results are available for di¤erent countries in Bargain et al. (2002, France), Beninger,
Laisney and Beblo (2002, Germany), Blundell, Lechene and Myck (2002, UK), Raquel
Carrasco and Javier Ruiz-Castillo (2002, Spain), Maria-Concetta Chiuri and Ernesto Lon-
gobardi (2002, Italy), and Vermeulen (2002, Belgium).
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4 Conclusion
Despite very important theoretical advancements in the modeling of labor supply of in-
dividuals in couples in the recent decade, there are few empirical applications of the
collective model. Accounting simultaneously for nonparticipation, nonconvex budget sets
and non-egoistic preferences present di¢ culties which have not yet been overcome by
usual identication and estimation techniques. This may explain why the unitary model
has remained the favored model in practical applications for the purpose of scal reform
analysis.
The aim of this methodological paper was to present an alternative approach to imple-
ment a collective model in the presence of nonconvex budget sets, nonparticipation and
individual preferences accounting for possible complementarity in spousesleisures. The
methodology is original in that it provides a way to map the complete Pareto frontier of
each household in the dataset using calibration. Identication relies on the estimation
of preference parameters on samples of male and female singles, assuming some persis-
tence in consumption-leisure preferences, and on the calibration of the bargaining outcome
and marriage-specic preference parameters on observed labor supplies of individuals in
couples.
In its capacity to handle nonconvex budget sets and labor force participation decisions
of both spouses, this model o¤ers a unique chance to perform tax reform simulation, and,
more fundamentally, to simulate reforms which impact not only on budget constraints but
also on the balance of power in the household. This is the purpose of the following paper
of the current issue, Myck et al. In addition, the model allows to compare unitary and
collective representations. More specically, a unitary model can be estimated on collec-
tive behavior (labor supplies predicted by the collective model). Subsequently, behavioral
responses of this unitary model can be compared to those of the correct collective model,
to gauge the discrepancies due to the wrongful unitary assumption. This is the topic of
the last paper in the current issue, Beninger et al.15
In addition to familiar limitations (limited account of children, absence of domestic
production, purely private consumption), the construction of the collective model pre-
sented here relies on a piecemeal approach that mixes estimation and calibration proce-




For the sake of completeness we give here some details on the estimation procedures used.
A.1 Wage equations
In order to obtain wage rates for the whole population, including those not working, we
estimate wage equations.
For singles we posit a linear normal selection model and use either the maximum
likelihood method or the two-steps Heckman procedure. We tried a number of di¤erent
estimation methods, including also two step methods with other regressors than the pre-
dicted normal hazard used in the Heckman approach, but the choices mentioned above
gave the most accurate predictions for working singles.
For couples we also estimate wage equations separately for wives and husbands. The
following conceptual di¢ culty arises here due to selectivity: a participation model would
need to be based on the collective framework, which is di¢ cult. However, Arthur Lewbel
(2000) proposes an estimation method for the selection model which does not require the
specication of the selection mechanism.16 The method relies on the existence of a variable
which is monotonically related to the selection variable: in the case of participation,
household unearned income is a plausible candidate though admittedly less so in the
collective than in the unitary approach, because of the e¤ect of household unearned income
on intrahousehold allocation. We use the simplest of the estimators proposed by Lewbel
for wives. For men we apply OLS, as the selectivity problem is much less severe for them,
and the OLS predictions are more accurate than those based on the Lewbel estimator.
A.2 Preferences of single women and men
We estimate preferences separately for women and men, assuming LES-type preferences:
i (ci; li) = 
i




i = f;m, (17)
where ci represents consumption (i.e. disposable income in this static model) and li
demand for leisure. ci and li are respectively the minimumrequirements in consumption
and leisure. Instead of estimating these, which proved di¢ cult, we chose to calibrate them.
The budget constraint is dened as:
ci = g (li; wi; yi; i) i = f;m, (18)
where wi and yi are respectively is gross wage rate and is unearned income, i represents
a vector of characteristics relevant to the tax system, and the function g expresses the
tax-benet schedule.
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For the estimation, we use a mixed multinomial logit model (MMNL) with mass
points on the consumption and leisure coe¢ cients in order to account for unobserved
heterogeneity (see James Heckman and Burton Singer, 1984, and Hilary Hoynes, 1996).17
We suppose that each person has J alternative values `j for his/her weekly labor supply,
leading to leisure choices lj = T   `j, where T is the total time available in a week:































where R denotes the number of mass points (or regimes), and pr the probability associated
with mass point r in the mixture. Three mass points appear su¢ cient, given the heavy
dominance of one of the regimes for both preference estimations, single women as well as
single men. We do not impose the constraint ic + 
i
l = 1 in the estimation, but check
that the estimates are positive, which allows to rescale the utility function by ic + 
i
l
afterwards. An alternative specication with ic = F (zi), where F denotes the logistic
cumulative distribution function, and zi a linear index depending on characteristics for
individual i, used for instance by Hoynes (1996), led to much lower likelihood values. The
reason for the superiority of not imposing the restriction icr + 
i
lr = 1 is that it amounts
to xing the scale of utility. The MMNL model results from adding iid-error terms to (17)
for each possible choice, with an extreme value distribution. This entails a xed variance,
which in turns identies the scale of utility (and thus the sum of the marginal valuations
of leisure and consumption).













After estimation, we allocate each observation to the regime yielding the best hours pre-
diction.
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Notes
1Within the collective approach, Denis Beninger (2000) and Olivier Donni (2003) pro-
vide theoretical results for the case of convex budget sets. Nicolas Moreau and Olivier
Donni (2002) estimate a household labor supply model for France accordingly, by convex-
ifying the budget sets and selecting participating couples. On the other hand, Richard
Blundell et al. (2001) tackle nonparticipation with linear budget constraints. But the
general case has not yet received proper treatment.
2Anyck Dauphin et al. (2005) test for the number of decision makers in a study on
consumption within the setting of Martin Browning and Pierre-André Chiappori (1998).
3Examples of collective models with more general preferences can be found in Brown-
ing and Chiappori (1998) and Pierre-André Chiappori, Bernard Fortin and Guy Lacroix
(2002).
4An alternative approach can be found in Martin Browning, Pierre-André Chiappori
and Arthur Lewbel (2004), who assume that singles and individuals in couples have the
same preferences over a bundle of private good equivalents. For singles, private good
equivalents equal observed quantities. For couples, a household consumption technology
transforms observed quantities into private good equivalents.
5Browning and Chiappori (1998) is an exception, but their paper is not primarily
concerned with labor supply and focuses on linear budget constraints. See also Chiappori,
Fortin and Lacroix (2002).
6Patricia Apps and Ray Rees (2001) present a model with household production that
also includes a calibration step. The theoretical distinction between individual and shared
leisure in a collective framework is investigated by Yuk-fai Fong and Junsen Zhang (2001).
Apps (2003) discusses the limitations of time use surveys in this context.
7See Martin Browning and Mette Gørtz (2005) for an empirical study taking advantage
of such data.
8This is also what Barmby and Smith (2001) do.
9In a full estimation approach,  would be estimated in a two stage procedure like
feasible generalized least squares. Here it is only roughly calibrated ex ante, with the
main aim of taking into account di¤erent discretizations of labor supplies of men and
women, as well as di¤erent hours distributions.
10For instance, using the PSID, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) nd a signicant
impact on the sharing rule of the sex ratio and the divorce laws across states for US
households.
11Indeed, the hypothesis of income pooling specic to the unitary model, but relaxed
by the collective model, is rejected by most tests in the empirical literature on collective
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models already quoted.
12Clearly, a more reliable identication could be obtained by using data covering a tax
reform along the lines of Richard Blundell, Alan Duncan and Costas Meghir (1998).
13Recall the denition of f in equation (8).
14One could think of iterating the procedure further, by re-calibrating the bargaining
power position given the estimated m (d) and f (d) until convergence, but this would
be costly in terms of computer time.
15Although we proceed in a fairly naive way by treating the collective model as deter-
ministic in Beninger et al., there is scope for full-scale simulation taking into account all
types of unobserved heterogeneity considered in the estimation/calibration approach, as
well as the uncertainty embodied in the estimated parameters. This concerns the estima-
tion of wages for the non-participants, the estimation of preference parameters for singles,
and the estimation/calibration of !f (e;d), 
m (d) and f (d) :
16We would like to thank Costas Meghir for pointing this out.
17We also estimated random parameter logit models (RPL, see, e.g., Daniel McFadden
and Kenneth Train, 2000) with a normal distribution of the constant terms in ic and 
i
l.
For several countries we obtained signicant dispersion for the consumption term, but not
for the leisure term, both for men and women. The specication with mass points on ic
alone strongly dominated the RPL specication in most cases, both in terms of likelihood
and in terms of accuracy of predictions.
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